Eric's Beijing Diary

Here in China, I have met more than one young person from Europe or America, who has come to China to study the history and language of this country. I, myself am interested in the history of China, so I naturally begin to discuss the subject, and try to get their thoughts on some issue or another. But if I refer to something that pertains to the many dynasties of China, the response is always the same, "Oh. I'm only interested in modern China." I am always intrigued by this comment, because I don't think it is possible properly to understand modern China without knowing something of what went on before. But certainly the predominant interest of those from the West who write about China, is the history of "Modern China," which I date from the Macartney Mission in 1793.

This new biography by Jonathan Fenby, former editor of the South China Morning Post, promises to be the definitive work on the subject for years to come. There are several reasons why I like his book. I will try to elucidate the most important. First of all, Chiang Kai-shek has often been seen by westerners as the person who "lost" China because of his refusal to fight the Japanese. Much of this view came from Barbara Tuchman's biography of Joseph Stillwell, which came out in '70 or '71. Stillwell was protrayed as the hero who tried to save China, but was prevented from doing so by Chiang. In actual fact, Stillwell was a jerk, who according to one of his strongest supporters (Marshall) was "his own worst enemy." He referred to Chiang Kai-shek as "Peanut," and FDR as "Rubber Legs." Jonathan Fenby sums up Stillwell with one simple statement: "He was the wrong man at the wrong time." Very well put.

But getting back to Chiang Kai-shek. Should he have concentrated more on fighting the Japanese, and not so much on fighting the Communists? Probably so. Chiang always said that the Japanese were a disease of the skin, and the Communists were a disease of the heart. In some ways, you could argue that history has supported his approach, because the Japanese were ultimately defeated, not by the Communists or the Nationalists, but by the Americans, when they dropped the bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But the problem is that the Americans made Europe a priority. Asia came second. And by the time the Japanese were finally defeated, too much damage had been done in terms of the relationship between the Nationalists and the laobaixing (common people) of China. If Chiang Kai-shek had fought more vociferously, he would certainly have prevented the Xi'an Incident, and may have been more likely to have the people with him by the time the Americans finally did what they had to to put the Japanese out of business. At least that's the thinking. It is very hard to say for sure.

But Fenby is fair. He shows that the Communists employed basically the same strategy--avoiding conflict with the Japanese to save themselves for the inevitable showdown with the KMT. So what is the truth. T?e fact is that both the Nationalists and the Communists fought the Japanese, but probably not as well as they could have if they had not been fighting each other. A nation divided against itself cannot stand. And then there is the matter of opium. It is well known that Chiang Kai-shek was supported by Big-Eared Du, who controlled the opium trade in Shanghai. But what is not commonly known is that Mao had a production facility for opium set up in Yanan. He fully intended to wipe out opium after the Communists were in power, but he could not resist the temptation to benefit from the sizeable revenue this drug brought in during a time when the fledgeling Communist Party desparately needed cash. According to Fenby, the production and sale of opium in Yan'an by the Communists brought in billions of dollars, and at one point constituted 40% of total revenue.

This is a sad book. But it is a very important one, because it deals so completely with a very important time in China's history. It is also important because it is missing much of the bias one way or another that characterized stuff that was written about Chiang Kai-shek during the cold war period. I don't know that it would be easy to follow for someone who is completely unfamiliar with 20th Century Chinese history. When you're reading this book it definitely helps to have some familiarity with the dramatis personae. That being said, it is a significant addition to the study of this period. And although it will probably not be sold openly on the mainland for a long time, it will definitely redefine the way this period is viewed, both by supporters and detractors of this most unusual figure in the history of modern China. Five stars without any hesitation.